I guess it makes sense to start at the start. This blog – at least for the time being – is going to center on my time and adventures teaching English in Japan. It used to be about international politics, human rights, China, and US foreign policy, and I still might write about those things. But for right now It’s going to be about Japan, what I’m doing here, and my life here.
Some general info: I’ll try (emphasis on the word try) to post about once a week. I will definitely try to keep the posts under 500 words – this is mostly a self-discipline thing. And I’ll try to send out emails whenever I write a post that’s relevant to my life, for example if I do something exciting. But if, for example, I were to perplexedly blog about the CCP blocking Bob Dylan from doing shows in China, forcing him to cancel all his dates in Asia, I probably wouldn’t send out an email. For example.
About Me Right Now: Many of you know me. What many of you don’t know is exactly what I’m doing with my life abroad. Right now, I live in Kumagaya City (熊谷 which I think means Bear Valley) in Saitama Prefecture, Japan. It’s about 60 minutes from Shinjuku, Tokyo – which I guess could be called the “center” of the city, or at least one of them. The central part of Kumagaya is pretty urban, but where I live, in a neighborhood near Kagohara Station (籠原), is quite a bit more rural. I live in the suburbs that wedged between a highway and a fairly major train line, so I can see trains passing to and fro about every 5 minutes (luckily though I can barely hear them). Here’s a map of the whole area. I live between Kagohara and Kumagaya, but much closer to Kagohara.
As for my job, which officially began Thursday April 8th, I’m an ALT, an Assistant Language Teacher of English. My job is to assist the main teacher – to varying extents – in planning lessons, playing games, and demonstrating proper English to the students. I teach at two schools, one elementary school, and one junior high school. The elementary school students that I teach are in the 5th and 6th grades, and the JHS students that I teach are in the (US equivalent of the) 7-9th grades, which are just called the JHS 1st 2nd and 3rd grades again.
A few days ago, the always enlightening Marketplace broadcast a rather interesting report compering the Chinese economic stimulus package to the US’. They made the point that the Chinese economic stimulus package was a lot better than the US package: (i.e. the Chinese stimulus package is actually designed to stimulate the economy).
The Chinese are pumping their $586 Billion into projects most (neo-Keynesian) economists believe will stimulate their economy. For example, 38% goes directly to public infrastructure (like roads, bridges, tunnels, irrigation canals, etc.) By contrast, our $787 Billion stimulus package is a bit of a red herring. We’ve devoted 37% ($288 Billion) to tax cuts for individuals. On lots of worthy programs, I assure you. These cuts will make it easier for people to tackle the myriad problems created by this recession. Congress also allocated 18% for state and local tax releif, mostly going to Medicare and education. Again, these are great, necessary programs that deserve funding, but not the kind that really stimulates the economy in the way that it needs to be. Republicans got angry because the stimulus package included funding for things like…the National Endowment for the Arts. Democrats get angry because of the tax cuts. Both bad elements stay in, neither stimulates the economy and funding for “shovel-ready” infrastructure projects is necessarily reduced, with the far off hope that our watered-down, non-stimulative, Frankensteinian stimulus pack will work. Great.
Now, take China. China did not have to deal with bureaucratic infighting between Democrats and Republicans over what percent of un-stimulative BS to include in the bill. Beijing just sent out it’s feelers into the people, and decided to do what was best for them, not what could potentially get them reelected next term (or ever, for that matter). That’s what’s so great about China. If Beijing sees a problem, (barring interference from local government and corruption, and all of China’s extensive systematic problems,) it can take the most appropriate steps necessary to fix it. The US system suffers greatly for our inability to take decisive action, when such action is necessary. Todd Buccholz does argue that China has bigger problems of a demographical nature, but I don’t think that’s why they wrote an effective package. They wrote an effective package because China bases its economy on continued economic growth and this stimulus is a way of maintaining/ensuring that. It’s not going to do nearly enough to fix China’s rampant unemployment/disenfranchisement problems (though it will take recognizable steps, especially in Wenchuan), nor can it do anything to change China’s ridiculous gender imbalance. What it can do is provide an example to the people to say: “hey! Look! We’re still legitimate. You have problems, we really can’t fix them, but you don’t base out legitimacy on your ability to find a wife. You base it on our ability to keep you mostly employed!”
I can almost forgive congressional Republicans for advocating tax-cuts. That’s about all they advocate; it’s about 1/5 of the Republican platform besides opposing civil rights for gays, opposing abortion, opposing Nancy Pelosi, and supporting tea-bagging. But the democrats really need to get their act together. Instead of providing lots of funds for pet projects (they’re not the only ones guilty, btw) they’d better serve the country and perhaps even the electorate by actually stimulating the economy and getting us out of this mess.
China cannot, will not, and will never sell off its US Treasury bonds en masse. Granted, I’m being a bit Sermanesque, but with good reason. Well, not good reason, but reason with unfortunate significance nonetheless. Recently, and somewhat less recently (here and here,) people have been speculating the consequences of China selling off US Treasury Bonds. These two above were specifically in regards to Human-Rights (or lack thereof)-based sanctions that the US threatened to impose…that it backed down from because well…we need our debt financed and stuff…I’ve already posted the statistics on the US’ debt to China, so I won’t bother reposting them. It’s just significant. I don’t see China selling them off, but we may very well reach a point where Beijing simply doesn’t want to buy any more. Right now, thankfully inflation is under control, but Premier Wen Jiabao’s most recent comments sent shockwaves through the halls of the Fed and the Treasury.
grandpa wen, like our dear leader is on Facebook
“President Obama and his new government have adopted a series of measures to deal with
the financial crisis. We have expectations as to the effects of these
measures,” “We have lent a huge amount of money to the
U.S. Of course we are concerned about the safety of our assets. To be
honest, I am definitely a little worried.”
On the topic of the US debt, what happens when China refuses to buy our bonds? I think that’s where the Republicans (well founded) fears come in. Inflationary spiral + Economic stagnation = Stagflation, somewhat like Japan in the 1990s. We’ve already got the virtually-zero-floating between 0.00 and 0.25 percent interest rate. In our current situation, the Fed is really running out of tools quickly. And while there are some significant differences between the collapse of Japan’s housing bubble economy circa 1990 (called the “Asset Bubble Crisis” — バブル景気: Bubble Economy) and the collapse of our housing bubble circa a year-and-a-half ago, the result unfortunately could be the the same. A “Lost Decade” sounds much more ominous than it’s actual implications, but this Japanese hyperbole belies the seriousness of the threat that prolonged Stagflation presents.
What I think we should take away from this, is be afraid (Especially if AEI or Kos are right). And hope that China keeps on financing our debt…it’s not like they’re going to call in all of our debt at once one day, but there may be a day that really comes-really soon, when Beijing just doesn’t want to buy up more US assets that it’s not sure it’ll gut back. I think the only thing we can do is attempt to intelligently spend our way out of this…even though there may be no way out of this mess but to create much more debt, and that scary i-word: inflation.
ick. ick. ick. but they’re right. we I will be paying this off.
also: great post exactly what i said, slightly less about Japan.
.i
As I mentioned earlier I’m very curious to see what other changes Hillary implements over at State. I think a good way to think about how the US’ foreign policy posture is shifting…or readjusting comes from the recent controversy or nontroversy on Secretary Clinton’s “failure” to press China on it’s human rights record during her recent trip to Asia. Let me stop right here and be clear to lay out what the US should be doing in regards to the PRC and Human Rights. We’re not going to see any significant change in how China deals with Human Rights if we don’t keep it as a priority. We really have nothing to lose by pressuring the PRC on Human Rights.
The US is still the PRC’s largest single trading partner and holds 22.3% of all foreign-held US Treasury Bonds; (this high percentage would, for some, signal a panic, since China holds so much US debt. I instead see it as China having a stake in the US’ future; if China dumps US debt, the devaluation of the Dollar will take Beijing and the CCP down with it) China is too interconnected to and dependent on the US to substantially rebuke a Human Rights agenda. They best they can do is ignore it and hope our shared economic interests will continue to cloud our interest in not having people tortured and unlawfully detained. Wait…
I understand why organisations like Amnesty International are “shocked” that Clinton didn’t push China harderat all regarding substantive Human Rights reform. Granted, it was a marked change from her tone at her last visit to China (what a headline!), but as the current Sec. State, her remarks were nothing remarkable; merely telegraphic: “our pressing on [issues of Human Rights] can’t interfere on the global economic
crisis, the global climate change crisis and the security crisis…” Clinton commented. Now AI is shocked, but their befuddlement is really unnecessary. For the above stated reasons, keeping China as a trading partner is simply too important for US policy-makers to bother with the PRC’s poor HR record.
Her 1995 Speech at the UN 4th World Conference on Women
No one should be shocked — this is what the US has been doing for decades: looking the other way, letting an authoritarian (or worse) regimes do as they please while we secure our interests. US foreign policy regarding Human Rights in the developing world is deceptively simple: “as long as we’re getting what we want, we’re happy.” Granted, sometimes “what we want” are a lack of protests against our involvement with genocidal states, but by and large, especially for a country as large as China, all but the most flagrant HR violations go unpunished.
Basically the US has bigger fish to fry, (two wars, transnational terrorism, a melting economy, global warming, need I continue?) and really needs to address issues like clean energy and economic development, (a clean environment btw, is one of the things Beijing views as an integral Human Right that it actively tries (though hindered by corruption) to promote in China) issues that China actually has a stake in; issues that Beijing actually could move on. It’s really no use trying to force Chinese to do something that’s maybe #3 or #4 on Beijing’s “THINGS THE CCP WON’T DO” list.
I really appreciate the Secretary’s candor in saying that we’ve had these conversations before and they haven’t gotten us anywhere. The Obama administration I think is doing a good job making our policy clear — even if it is more conciliatory to China than a lot of activists would have wanted. Ultimately, it’s as conciliatory as it would ever have been, no matter who was elected, or who was Sec. State, though perhaps not as transparent as the Clinton-Obama approach.
This is the first part of a two part entry on Hilary Clinton, though this one I think, will focus changes that she’s making over at State. Or rather, one particular set of changes that will make a lot of people’s lives a lot easier. A few weeks ago The Advocate outlined the changes that Hilary’s looking to make, specifically in regards to gay rights. Historically, It’s been pretty difficult for gays to serve abroad as FSO’s (Foreign Service Officers) or USAID overseas officers – only in 1995 did President Clinton simplify the process for gays to get security clearances, i.e. work for D.o.State. Since then gays have been able to serve with all the same rights as heterosexuals in State; however, it’s a different case for families of Foreign Service Officers, particularly non-spouse partners.
Immigration is under no obligation to provide foreign-born partners with US visas to live with a domestically assigned FSO. It continues:“For domestically assigned FSOs with U.S.-citizen partners, one of the
most difficult issues is the lack of benefits for partners. Federal statutes
control who is eligible to receive employment benefits such as health
insurance, life insurance, and retirement annuity. The U.S. Government
does not give unmarried partners access to such benefits. The Department
of State, as well as all other Federal Agencies and Departments, is bound
by federal law in this regard and does not have independent discretion
to offer these benefits. Contrary to popular belief, the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) says
nothing about partnership benefits. It simply makes explicit that the
definition of “marriage” and “spouse” in existing
Federal law and regulation refers to a legal marriage between one man
and one woman. In theory, nothing in DOMA prevents the Federal Government
from separately authorizing accommodations or benefits for gay couples
in addition to those already enjoyed by legally married heterosexual couples.
Legislation to do just this is routinely proposed in the U.S. House of
Representatives, but has yet to pass.”
Internationally, it’s not much easier; all of the aforementioned applies as well as these provisions:
Partners can’t be included on travel orders.
Partners can’t get diplomatic passports – meaning they have to apply for visas, and leave the country if their visa status changes.
Gay and Lesbian couples don’t qualify as married couples, so they can’t be assigned together
“Inclusion in travel orders for same-sex domestic partners of
FSOs
Access
to training, including all language classes, area studies,
and embassy effectiveness classes for same-sex
domestic partners of FSOs
Emergency evacuation and medevac from post when necessary
for same-sex domestic partners of FSOs
Access
to post health units for same-sex domestic partners of FSOs
Visa
support for same-sex domestic partners accompanying FSOs to
overseas postings, and for same-sex foreign-born domestic
partners accompanying FSOs to postings in Washington
or elsewhere in the U.S.
Preferential status for employment at post, comparable to
that enjoyed by eligible family members, for same-sex
domestic partners of FSOs.“
Basically, this is really good news for gay people in the Foreign Service. It means that their lives will be just as hard as the lives of straight people serving in the Foreign Service. Gay couples won’t have the same rights as married couples – that can’t happen federally until the DOMA is repealed, but it will provide them unprecedented security and the ability to actually raise a family. Now. What does this have to do with US foreign policy? What does this mean for the State Department? A lot actually. Hillary has, in more than one way reversed former Secretary Rice’s positions. Under Rice:
“Congressional
members sent a similar letter to former secretary
Condoleezza Rice last year, but the concerns fell on deaf
ears. Then-assistant secretary Jeffrey Bergner
sent a response stating that the department recruits
and promotes employees “without regard to sexual
orientation” and affords benefits to unmarried
partners of employees in accordance with the Foreign
Affairs Manual (at 3 FAM 4180). The letter failed to
acknowledge any inequalities faced by officers in same-sex
relationships.”
This really leads me to wonder what other policy changes are in store for the new Department of State under Mrs. Clinton and Mr. Obama. Given her recent statements on China, my guess is that the times, they are a changin’ – at least to the extent that we’ll soon have a much more open/transparent foreign policy – probably not that much is going to change substantially, quickly. But more about that, in reference to China very soon.
There are probably a few foreign policy memos going around 华盛顿(Huáshèngdùn – Washington) right now, trying to figure out what to do about Hugo Chávez, who (if the results of these certified “free and fair” elections are to be believed,) will be able to stand for reelection indefinitely after his term was set to expire in 2013. Chávez is obviously excited about this outcome, and it probably should cause the U.S. some concern. I wonder, how much though. Besides spitting a lot of rhetoric about George Bush being a diablo, (or was it DIABLO III?) Obama being a Pentagon puppet, and basically making an international career out of hating on what he deems U.S. Imperialism, his functional power global affairs is limited and somewhat self-inflated. More importantly, what the heck does all of this have to do with China?
As the 5th largest exporter of oil, Venezuela has a certain amount of leverage over the U.S. and most of our hemisphere. Shouldn’t we be concerned? Perhaps. But I think Chávez (Venezuela, and his entire Bolívarian revolution) has a lot more to gain from good U.S.-Venezuela relations than can be gained gain from poor ones. Yes, he controls a vital U.S. resource, but it is U.S. dollars buying Venezuelan oil that fund much of his economy. Oil exports to the U.S. comprise some 60 PER CENT of Venezuela’s oil-exports – the very same exports on which their entire economy is based. It is thus pretty understandable that Chávez has backed off from his previous threats to cut off U.S. oil exports, which comprise 11 per cent of our imported oil. As the recent CFR Report rightly contends, the U.S. and Venezuelan economies are simply too interconnected for such a significant rift to occur. Thinking in terms of power: Chávez can’t cut off oil to the U.S., and the U.S. (or Colombia or the U.S. Empire or someone; Chávez’ rhetoric is confusing) can’t attack Venezuela (since, as Chávez points out, oil prices would rise to $300 a barrel…though…they’re probably gonna be that high in a few years anyway).
I mention all this before launching into a discussion of China because Chávez is – to some extent – following the Chinese developmental model. Mostly in the extent that it is not an American developmental model, a la Washington Consensus of the IMF, WORLD BANK, and U.S.GOVERNMENT (they get caps because theyre “E.V.I.L.“). I wonder how pleased Beijing is that Venezuela too is pursuing an economic development model radically different from the one that the U.S. supports? I’m sure Chávez’ claim that he’s been a Maoist since he was a child delighted CCP elites. For China, this means another potential partner and potential opposer to U.S. unipolarity or unilateralism.
Still, with oil prices suddenly reasonable – at least for now, (the NYTimes argues, and I agree that) Chávez will have to moderate his message and Bolívarian-Socialist reforms. As he approaches 2013, he will likely have to bridge the wide gaps in his country and make his message appeal to the millions of people who have tried to depose him or otherwise limit his consolidation of power (5 million people, 45 per cent of the electorate voted not to allow him to do away with term limits). Like China, without the power of oil, he’s have do actually deal with social discontent, instead of merely talking big. Without oil, he’s likely to make more limited reform, instead of the sweeping socialist reform that he’s promised.
the east and rest are apparantly red now…
Chávez, like the CCP, isn’t going anywhere. He, however, will have to moderate his message if he is to affect the kind of change he wants and the reforms his country needs, which contrary to the beliefs of the sometimes-McCarthy-esque U.S. media-intelligentsia-government establishment, might actually be a good thing (mostly). Hugo would do well to keep in mind the words of Simón Bolívar: “Nothing is as dangerous as allowing the same citizen to remain in power for a long time.” As Chávez’ power to influence the world potentially wanes, he will likely entrench domestically (see: China on June 5th 1989) which would only lead to further discontent in the minds of the millions of students and elites that want him out. Chávez needs to moderate, and likely will, lest he incite destabilizing domestic riots. The U.S. needs to watch him carefully, but doesn’t need to worry. China…is probably tickled that Chávez is kinda-sorta following their model…but ultimately has bigger concerns than the South American upstart. China would benefit from a strong Venezuela, but the CCP ultimately, doesn’t really care.
While I’m not one of those Sinologists that makes his living predicting the “Coming Collapse of China,” (any day now Gordon…) I do believe that the PRC has some serious structural problems that it is currently facing, and addresses them with varying degrees success. These, exacerbated by the current economic crisis is a dangerous cocktail.
I think Beijing has a pretty good idea about the things going on in China, even if there is no consensus on how to improve state-society relations and deepen the PRC’s governance. They know about the hundreds of millions of (sometimes disposed, sometimes not) migrant workers, they know about the labor riots at State-Owened Enterprises that are slowly being forced out due to China’s burgeoning capitalist (i said it) economic system, they know about the widespread unpopularity of their Family Planning policies (more colloquially know as the “One-Child Policy”).
These problems are endemic: serious issues that the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) has to deal with. My point is that they expect to deal with them. People weren’t clamoring for democracy 10 years ago when these same problems existed, and I think – mostly due to the CCP’s vice-like control over the internet through the quite-aptly-named “Great Firewall,” and the immense censorship bureaucracy – that the likelihood of a homegrown, grassroots democracy movement in China is extremely slim. Similarly, I don’t see any of the above mentioned problems (by the way, this list is by no means all-inclusive,) decimating CCP legitimacy by themselves.
I am concerned about China’s economy. Would it be so far-fetched to think that China is no more than a paper tiger…well i suppose in its case, a paper elephant? Could China’s sometimes double-digit growth rates have been forged to attract foreign investment? Maybe. Do foreign investors and very likely the Chinese themselves, place too much faith in the seemingly-indefatigable Chinese economy (in the latter case, resting much of the legitimacy of the party-state apparatus on the economy’s continued growth)? Certainly. China’s economic model is that complex: make cheap (sometimes toxic, see melamine) things, and sell them domestically, but mostly abroad.
There is nothing special about the Chinese people that makes them really, really good at making low cost consumer products. Koreans did it, the Japanese did, but both of those formerly planned economies are now focused in technology and other sectors requiring the highly-skilled labour market that simply doesn’t exist in the PRC. China has a lot of people, but so do India, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam and the Phillipenes. And it’s a lot cheaper to produce in those countries in South East Asia than it is in China, to the extent that they often times hire little slave kids (serious, and less serious).
My point, is that the CCP has put probably 50 eggs in the “Continued Economic Growth” basket, and the other two in the “Nationalism and Patriotic Education” basket. My fear is that this current economic crisis will best the PRC. I’m kind of in the same school of thought as Minxin Pei, who argues that China is doomed to a exist as a semi-developed autocratic state, and will miss it’s full potential. Granted the CCP leadership is closely watching this economic crisis, and has pumped $586 billion into its economy, but considering the immense size of the Chinese economy and the depth of this crisis, it may not be enough. That, and I think only an economic crisis would threaten the legitimacy of the CCP in a way that would lead to a significant change in China. I’m not talking collapse, but stagnation or merely a new paradigm for China. It may lose it’s “emerging superpower” status, and instead, be forced to relegate to a position like Russia (in the current low-price-of-oil world): Much less relevant than they want to be.
While this weblog focuses on a number of topics, they will most often be related to China, Japan, US Politics, or International Politics.
I graduated from Davidson College in 2009, with a degree in East Asian Studies. I’ve got a strong interest in international relations, I’ve dabbled with gender and identity issue in media, and I’ve got a soft spot for civil rights issues as well.
I’m a 22 year-old indie music fan. Interests include life, love, literature, coffee, history, photography, politics, China, music, film, Japan, and culture.
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